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Abstract 
The article deals with the role of empirical – in particular of behavioral – research for the 
law. The following questions will be answered: What is the position of behavioral legal 
research in the larger spectrum of legal and non-legal disciplines, like governance research, 
neo-classical economic analysis of law, legal sociology, and traditional legal doctrine? Does 
behavioral legal research merely employ empirical descriptive methods or does it contain 
specific normative theories? Which are the risks of empirical legal and behavioral research? 
Which are the relevant research questions in the area of private law as opposed to public 
law? It is argued that behavioral legal research should not be reduced to a mere economic 
analysis approach to law, but be rather placed in the broader concept of a “legal-empirical 
governance analysis” (LEGA). 
Der Aufsatz beschäftigt sich mit der Rolle empirischer – insbesondere “behavioraler” – 
Forschungen für die Rechtswissenschaften. Die folgenden Fragen werden beantwortet: 
Welche Position nimmt behavioral-rechtswissenschaftliche Forschung innerhalb des Spek-
trums juristischer und nicht-juristischer Disziplinen ein, wie zB gegenüber der Governance-
Forschung, der neo-klassischen ökonomischen Analyse des Rechts, der Rechtssoziologie 
und der traditionellen Rechtsdogmatik? Verwendet behavioral-rechtswissenschaftliche 
Forschung bloß empirische deskriptive Methoden oder umfasst sie spezifische normative 
Theorien? Was sind die Risiken von empirisch-rechtswissenschaftlicher Forschung? Was 
sind die relevanten Forschungsfragen im Bereich des Privatrechts (im Vergleich zum 
Öffentlichen Recht)? Es wird argumentiert, dass behavioral-rechtswissenschaftliche 
Forschung nicht zu einer bloßen ökonomischen Analyse des Rechts reduziert werden, 
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sondern in das breitere Konzept einer „empirisch-rechtswissenschaftlichen Governance-
Analyse“ (LEGA) integriert werden sollte. 
Subjects: empirical research; behavioral legal research; governance; behavioral law and 
economics; economic analysis of law; legal realism.  
 
To look beyond the law into its social, economic, psychological, cultural and political 
contexts does not mean to depreciate law and legal doctrine or to risk its foundations.1 To 
engage in interdisciplinary research may mean all of the following: challenge, chance, 
widening, risk, and burden. The most recent interdisciplinary trend in legal research which 
currently enjoys a high degree of popularity among governments and legislators in the US 
and in the EU is “behavioral research”, most often conducted by economists as 
(experimental) “behavioral economics” in the context of markets.  
This article will elaborate on the following questions:  
I.  What is the position of behavioral legal research in the larger spectrum of legal 
disciplines and of law-related non-legal disciplines: What is, for instance, its relationship 
to governance research, to neo-classical economic analysis of law, to legal sociology, 
and to traditional legal doctrine? 
II. Does behavioral legal research merely employ empirical descriptive methods or does it 
contain specific normative theories? In case of normativity: What is its main orientation?  
III. Which are the risks of empirical legal and behavioral research? 
IV. Which are the relevant research questions in the area of private law as opposed to 
public law? 
 
I. In chapter I, I will argue that behavioral legal research and behavioral economic research 
are only two components of a larger concept of a “legal-empirical governance analysis” 
(LEGA). This governance analysis examines problem solving, decision making, organization 
and control on the basis and within the framework of law from an interdisciplinary 
perspective. The behavioral branch of the analysis concentrates on the psychological 
processes of individual decision making in the context of legal rules, taking into account a 
variety of (non-legal) decision influencing factors like for example: personal characteristics, 
characteristics of the situation, social norms, and cultural patterns. This type of study often 
                                                
1 For an excellent account of the debate between “doctrinalists” and “multi-disciplinarians” in the US and in Europe 
see Rob van Gestel and Hans-W. Micklitz, Why Methods matter in European Legal Scholarship, 20 EUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL 
292 (2014): The authors argue correctly that doctrinal legal research plays an important role in (a critical approach to) 
EU law and is not rendered irrelevant by multi-disciplinary “law and …” research. They deplore the increasing 
instrumentalisation of law and legal research and the decreasing attention for methodology. See also ROB VAN GESTEL, 
HANS-W. MICKLITZ, AND MIGUEL POIARES MADURO, METHODOLOGY IN THE NEW LEGAL WORLD, EUI Working Papers LAW 2012/13. 
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overlaps in part with the studies of behavioral economists who analyze individual decision 
making in an economic context, but it cannot be reduced to a behavioral economic analysis 
of law. Behavioral legal research does not exclude or impair other strands of legal-
empirical research which concentrate more or exclusively on social, political, institutional 
or cultural contexts. LEGA – and behavioral legal research as one of its parts – can be 
interpreted as a form of “new legal realism” in the sense of Nourse and Shaffer: The new 
legal realists propose additional or alternative research concepts to classical (formalist) 
approaches: like isolated doctrinalism and neo-classical economic analysis of law. 
II. Behavioral research as applied to law could, in theory, assume a value-neutral 
descriptive standpoint. In reality, authors most often place it in a normative and political 
context. It is possible and recommendable to make both elements of the research – the 
empirical and the normative – transparent and discuss them separately. Apart from the 
particular methodology of “emergent analytics”, the normative theories endorsed by 
behavioral scholars are not a consequence of their empirical findings. The political conflicts 
tackled by the legal system form the basis of normative theories, these conflicts remain the 
same. The contributions of behavioral empirical research to normative theories can be 
seen as rather indirect and comparatively small. The discovery of particular weaknesses of 
individuals which influence their decision making processes in a negative way seems to 
prove that people are more vulnerable than traditional law – sticking to its homo 
economicus model – assumed. This empirical finding delivers an additional argument in 
favor of theories that advocate strong state regulation of markets in order to prevent harm 
to these individuals or the economy. Behavioral empirical research has shed new light on 
some questions crucial for normative theories, like: What is an “informed decision”? What is 
a “free decision”? It thus gives us the chance to re-open the normative debate on the right 
version of paternalism on an interdisciplinary level. A closely linked debate – also freshly 
inspired by recent behavioral research – is the debate about the role and the value of 
economic models (which ones?) for the law. 
III. In chapter III, I will argue that our enthusiasm about new research questions should not 
blind us for the risks and burdens of empirical research and its “application” to the law. 
Many studies conducted from a psychological or economic perspective do not allow for 
conclusions on law oriented decision making. Psychological studies often employ artificial 
settings that might provoke different behavior than in legal reality. Strong normative 
theories might render empirical research self-referential causing the false impression of 
“scientific” proof of the researchers’ normative agenda. The danger of “reductionism” 
(reducing law to only one dimension) can be overcome by connecting behavioral research 
to a broader legal-empirical governance analysis. The considerable costs and the time-
consuming nature of legal-empirical research call for a thorough cost-benefit analysis 
which works with realistic predictions of the possible scientific or knowledge gains. 
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IV. In contrast to the two pole analysis in public law of the relationship between the 
regulating state and the citizen, behavioral research in private law should expand its 
perspective to (at least) three agents: the government, and the two parties to a private law 
relationship. It has to be noted that “wrong” decisions of contracting parties are not only 
caused by biases and other decisional inadequacies (rooted in the citizens’ brains) but also 
by the market situation (e.g. asymmetric lack of information) or by the other party of a 
contract who abuses her dominant position to the detriment of the weaker party. One 
group of research questions deals with the normative models of citizens widely used in 
private law: like the model of the informed average consumer or of the ordinary merchant. 
The areas of unfair commercial practices regulation and competition law are in their 
normative approaches largely depending on such normative models of market actors and, 
therefore, offer ample space for behavioral legal research. The currently most examined 
and most popular research question in private law is: How can state regulation help 
citizens or weaker parties (e.g. consumers) in exercising their private autonomy more in 
their own interest, thus overcoming dangers that are created by themselves, by the market 
situation or by the other market actors. The potential of reducing, framing, anchoring, 
standardizing information and warnings, of using new interactive electronic information 
schemes, or of creating safe standardized default contracts is doubtlessly great. Research 
in this area should also include the questions of how the notions of “freedom of decision” 
and “knowledge” are constructed by the law and whether these legal constructs are in 
reasonable proximity of the decisional reality of people. What is the role of ignorance, what 
is the role of heuristics in decision making? In private law, there are two human actors to 
be influenced – or “nudged” – in their behavior: Authors tend to neglect the question of 
how to nudge enterprises into behaving more fairly to weaker parties. In cases like unfair 
clauses in standard contract terms, irresponsible lending, or usury loans autonomy based 
soft instruments (information, nudges) might stay relatively ineffective. At this point, we 
need mandatory legislation which prohibits grossly unfair contractual relations (enforced 
by interest organizations or state authorities). The research question for behavioral legal 
analysis in that respect is: Where are the behavioral limits of soft instruments which are as 
cleverly designed as possible, i.e. in accordance with the latest “behavioral insights”? This 
goes to the middle of the paternalism debate (chapter II). 
V. I will conclude with an overall positive evaluation of the chances and expected gains of a 
type of “behavioral legal research” which is not merely a behavioral economic analysis of 
law. If placed in the broader concept of LEGA and combined with a realistic awareness of all 
its risks and limitations, this type of research is likely to provide new and helpful insights 
for scholars, judges and legislators in the field of private law. 
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I. Behavioral Legal Research in its Broader Context of Other Disciplines: Governance 
and New Legal Realism  
Before the advent of legal realism in the 1920ies2 and of economic analysis of law in the 
1970ies3, legal research in the United States spent a life of splendid isolation in its realm of 
legal doctrine and formalism which was not connected to other disciplines like economics, 
sociology, or political sciences. In Europe, where the influence of legal realism and law and 
economics never was as strong as in the United States – neither in the legislative process 
nor in academic writing and teaching – the tradition of “doctrinal isolation” is still the 
prevailing reality. Presently, this prevailing reality in European legal thought is facing a new 
and very serious attack: behavioral research, governance research, and other movements 
that connect the law (public and private, procedural and substantive) to various types of 
empirical research. Though “behavioral economics” and “governance theory” have been the 
most prominently discussed and most attractive movements in the last 10 years for the 
European legislator and European researchers, those two approaches must be seen in the 
context of the whole of empiricist research that was and is about to be conducted in 
connection with the law. 
In their famous article of 2009 Nourse and Shaffer4 described a movement in – primarily US 
American but also European – legal research which they called “new legal realism”. As the 
old legal realism was a reaction to 19th century’s doctrinal formalism, the new realism is 
seen as a reaction to neo-classical economic analysis of law as its formalist (though also 
instrumentalist) counterpart. Neo-classical law and economics avoids human psychology, 
social, historical and institutional contexts, which new legal realists want to re-introduce.5 
According to the authors, both old and new formalism have a neo-liberal orientation, 
whereas old and new realists are rather inclined to the other side of the political spectrum 
(i.e. are in favor of more government intervention for social and public interests).6 
Nourse and Shaffer develop the following taxonomy of new legal realist movements:7 One 
school is the “behaviorists” – comprising the “attitudinal model” of political scientists (stud-
ying the behavior of judges) and “behavioral economics”. A second school, the “contex-
tualists”, conducts empirical studies of the “law in action”, i.e. of law and behavior in their 
social contexts.8 The third school, called the “institutionalists”, is convinced that the pursuit 
of all goals is shaped by complex institutional processes. Among these, the proponents of 
                                                
2 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921); Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence – The Next 
Step, 30 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 431 (1930). 
3 RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1st ed. 1972); (7th ed. 2007). 
4 Victoria Nourse and Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New World Order Prompt a New Legal 
Theory? 95 CORNELL LAW REVIEW 61 et seq. (2009). 
5 Victoria Nourse and Gregory Shaffer, 95 CORNELL LAW REVIEW 61, 74 (2009) 
6 Victoria Nourse and Gregory Shaffer, 95 CORNELL LAW REVIEW 61, 96 (2009). 
7 Victoria Nourse and Gregory Shaffer, 95 CORNELL LAW REVIEW 61, 76 et seq. (2009). 
8 The authors observe that empirical legal studies “have exploded in the legal academy” in the US in the years 
between 1999 and 2009 [Victoria Nourse and Gregory Shaffer, 95 CORNELL LAW REVIEW 61, 93 (2009)]. 
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“new governance theory” search for innovative problem-solving methods for law creation 
and implementation and oppose a court-centric, rights-focused approach to law.9 The 
institutionalist supporters of the “anti-domination model” replace the traditional model of 
the autonomous rational actor by the “vulnerable” actor. In their “vulnerability analysis” 
they focus on structures and institutions instead of individual actions.10 
Different schools of new legal realism emphasize different aspects or perspectives of a 
problem (for instance psychological processes, social influences, different structures or 
institutions) or analyze different scenarios (for instance the behavior of judges, the 
behavior of consumers or businesses). They share, however, certain characteristics: the 
concern for the law in reality (“law in action”) operating in a complex system of various 
institutions and influences; a constructivist approach; multi-disciplinary research; a 
combination of normative theories and empirical research. The agenda of legal research is 
broadened: It is not the only task of legal research to develop doctrines that guide the 
application and interpretation of existing legal rules in courts, but it can also supply 
empirical data of the “law in action” and, thus, provide guidance for future action of law 
makers or appliers of law on the basis of thorough and comprehensive analysis of decision 
making processes and human behavior.  
The common characteristics of new legal realism can be integrated in a broad concept of 
“governance analysis” (not coinciding with the “new governance theory” mentioned supra) 
which is an analytical method rather than a normative theory with a certain political 
orientation or a certain set of values. In that respect, it differs from normative concepts of 
“good governance” like the concepts used by the IMF and the World Bank11 (for evaluating 
the performance of national governments). It is also not identical with “governance” in the 
sense of the EU Commission’s White Paper published in 200112 (trying to promote 
voluntary modes of governance at the expense of compulsory regulation), though the EU’s 
White Paper on Governance can be considered a (normative) strand of the broader 
analytical governance concept developed in this article. I would like to call this concept 
“legal-empirical governance analysis” (LEGA). Behavioral legal research and behavioral 
economic research are only two components among many others in this analysis. LEGA 
examines processes of problem solving and decision making, as well as organization and 
                                                
9 Victoria Nourse and Gregory Shaffer, 95 CORNELL LAW REVIEW 61, 88 (2009). 
10 Victoria Nourse and Gregory Shaffer, 95 CORNELL LAW REVIEW 61, 89, 111 (2009). 
11 See for instance Ngaire Woods, The Challenge of Good Governance for the IMF and the World Bank Themselves, 28 
WORLD DEVELOPMENT 823 (2000); Ved P. Nanda, The “Good Governance” Concept Revisited, 603 ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN 
ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 269 (2006). 
12 COMMISSION, EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE – A WHITE PAPER, OJ 12 October 2001, C 287/1; Joanne Scott and David M. Trubek, 
Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to Governance in the European Union, 8 EUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL 1 (2002); Ludger 
Radermacher, The European Commission’s White Paper on European Governance: The Uneasy Relationship between Public 
Participation and Democracy, 3 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL (2002) available online at www.germanlawjournal.com; Burkard 
Eberlein and Dieter Kerwer, New Governance in the European Union: A Theoretical Perspective, 42 JOURNAL OF COMMON 
MARKET STUDIES 121 (2004);  Kenneth A. Armstrong, The Character of EU Law and Governance: From “Community Method” 
to New Modes of Governance, 64 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 179 (2011).  
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control on the basis and within the framework of law13 from an interdisciplinary 
perspective. The actors subjected to the analysis are citizens and market participants as 
well as legislators, judges and administrative officials. The prescriptive as well as descriptive 
disciplines (usually) involved are law and legal theory, economics, psychology, sociology 
and political science.  
The behavioral branch of LEGA concentrates on the psychological processes of individual 
decision making (by law makers, judges, market participants, citizens) in the context of legal 
rules, taking into account a variety of (non-legal) decision influencing factors like for 
example: personal characteristics, characteristics of the situation,14 social norms, or 
cultural patterns. In the last decades, many hitherto unknown characteristics of human 
behavior have been revealed in great detail by scientists. The behavior departs 
considerably from the model of the rational selfish “economic man” widely used in 
economics and in law. Cognitive and behavioral psychology assisted by neuroscience show 
for instance that human decision making is influenced by numerous stable and practically 
relevant “biases” and “heuristics” of judgment. Moreover, people’s preferences usually 
depend on a time factor and people may pursue goals other than maximizing their own 
benefit.  
Micro-economics have since long been working on – from their perspective – adequate 
reactions to these findings: The economic models were partially corrected and brought 
closer to reality. A new discipline of economics – “behavioral economics” – was established. 
Behavioral and neuroscientific marketing research takes advantage of the particular 
characteristics of human decision making processes with the goal of increasing the 
turnover of enterprises. In law, researchers15 and law makers16 are just about to catch up:17 
                                                
13 German authors speak of “normgeprägtes Entscheiden” – norm oriented decision making: see Wolfgang Hoffmann-
Riem, Governance als Perspektivenerweiterung in der Rechtswissenschaft, 1 AUSTRIAN LAW JOURNAL  6 (2014). 
14 Jan Crusius, Femke van Horen, and Thomas Mussweiler, Why Process Matters: A Social Cognition Perspective on 
Economic Behavior, 33 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY 677 (2012). 
15 The legal aspects of behavioral research were first discussed in US literature. Publications by European authors are 
still relatively rare. US: among many others see Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, and Richard H. Thaler, A Behavioral 
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STANFORD LAW REVIEW 471 (1998); CASS R. SUNSTEIN (ed.), BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 
(2000); RICHARD H. THALER AND CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGES: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH AND HAPPINESS (2008); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW 1349 (2011); Christine Jolls and 
Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 199 (2006); Russell B. Korobkin and Thomas S. 
Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science. Removing the Rationality Assumption, 88 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 1051 (2000); Russell B. 
Korobkin, What Comes After the Victory for Behavioral Law and Economics, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW 1653 (2011). In 
Europe see for instance: GERD GIGERENZER AND CHRISTOPH ENGEL (eds.), HEURISTICS AND THE LAW (2006); CHRISTOPH ENGEL, 
MARKUS ENGLERTH, JÖRN LÜDEMANN, AND INDRA SPIEKER (eds.), RECHT UND VERHALTEN (2007); HOLGER FLEISCHER AND DANIEL ZIMMER 
(eds.), DER BEITRAG DER VERHALTENSÖKONOMIE (BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS) ZUM HANDELS- UND WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT (2011); Alberto 
Alemanno, On Amir, Luc Bovens, Adam Burgess, Orly Lobel, Kyle Powys Whyte, and Evan Selinger, Nudging Healthy 
Lifestyles – Informing Regulatory Governance with Behavioral Research, 3 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF RISK REGULATION (2012) 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2005672; Alberto Alemanno and Alessandro Spina, Nudging 
Legally. On the Checks and Balances of Behavioral Regulation, 12 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 429 (2014); 
ANNE-LISE SIBONY AND ALBERTO ALEMANNO (eds.), NUDGING AND THE LAW: WHAT CAN EU LEARN FROM BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES? 
(forthcoming).  
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Can the human-law-interface be improved by rendering the law more “ergonomic”? With 
other words: Can legal steering instruments, legal arrangements or new forms of law 
enforcement be developed which are more effective because they take better account of 
the particularities of human behavior? Some speak of “smart regulation” meaning legal 
rules that take advantage of this detailed “scientific” (empirically acquired) knowledge 
about human behavior in order to reach their regulatory goals more smoothly and 
effectively.  
This is, of course, only one part of the larger picture of problem solving by law (and its 
examination by LEGA). Legal rules are not the only factors that influence people’s behavior. 
Many legal rules cannot be seen simply as “instrumental”. Not all problem solving by law 
involves (exclusively) individual decisions of citizens: For instance consumer organizations 
or the government might be better able to tackle an issue than individuals exercising their 
private autonomy would.18 Though the approach of many behavioral studies of law is 
clearly instrumental, such studies do not exclude a broader governance analysis concept. 
Behavioral research, contextualism and institutional analysis are mutually inclusive.19 
Behavioral legal research often overlaps in part with the study of economic decisions of 
market participants (or market rule makers) by behavioral economists. Until today, a lot of 
behavioral research has been and is being conducted by economists, comparatively little 
by legal scholars. The temptation for the latter to simply refer to behavioral economic 
research and thereby (tacitly) import economic models, economists’ thinking and an 
                                                                                                                            
16 See the “Behavioral Insights Team” in the US http://inudgeyou.com/ established by the Obama administration in 
2013 (collaborating with Harvard University’s “Behavioral Insights Group”) and the  “Behavioral Insights Team” in the 
UK http://www.behaviouralinsights.co.uk/ established by the Cameron administration in 2010;   Burgess, ‚Nudging‘ 
Healthy Lifestyles: The UK Experiments with the Behavioral Alternative to Regulation and the Market, 3 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF 
RISK REGULATION 1 (2012) http://ssrn.com/abstract=2005672; in Germany the Merkel administration established a 
behavioral insights group (in the “Stab Politische Planung, Grundsatzfragen und Sonderaufgaben” of the 
“Bundeskanzleramt”) in 2014; in 2014 the OECD established a behavioral unit in its Network of Economic Regulators. 
For the field of consumer protection see: OECD, CONSUMER POLICY TOOLKIT 42 et seq. (2010) 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/consumer/consumerpolicytoolkit.htm; BETTER REGULATION EXECUTIVE AND NATIONAL CONSUMER 
COUNCIL, WARNING TOO MUCH INFORMATION CAN HARM (November 2007); OFCOM (regulator for UK communications 
industries), A REVIEW OF CONSUMER INFORMATION REMEDIES (March 2013); VERBRAUCHERZENTRALE BUNDESVERBAND, INFORMATION 
GUT, ALLES GUT? EMPFEHLUNGEN FÜR WIRKSAME INFORMATIONEN (November 2011); NATALI HELBERGER, FORM MATTERS: INFORMING 
CONSUMERS EFFECTIVELY, STUDY COMMISSIONED BY BEUC (September 2013); the EU Commission finances interdisciplinary 
research projects in order to enhance the effectiveness and quality of its legislation (see for instance the FP7 project 
„CORPUS“ dealing with sustainable consumer policy (food, traffic, housing) and the FP7 project „iFamily“ dealing with 
health policy). 
17 For a rather recent overview of government activities connected with behavioral research  
around the globe see Cass R. Sunstein, The Council of Psychological Advisers, 2014 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2496438. 
18 Sabine Frerichs, False Promises? A Sociological Critique of the Behavioral Turn in Law and Economics, 34 JOURNAL OF 
CONSUMER POLICY 289 (2011). 
19 Christoph Engel and Gerd Gigerenzer, Law and Heuristics: An Interdisciplinary Venture, in GERD GIGERENZER AND 
CHRISTOPH ENGEL (eds.), HEURISTICS AND THE LAW 1, 7, 14 (2006).
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exclusively economic perspective on the law is considerable. Thus, the danger for 
behavioral legal research to become a new version of economic analysis of law is evident.20  
This development towards a “behavioral economic analysis of law” or “behavioral law and 
economics” is, however, not an inevitable consequence of a behavioral (i.e. an empirical 
psychological) approach to the “law in action” as a basis for the development of 
recommendations for legal and institutional change. Where behavioral legal research is 
seen as part of the much wider concept of LEGA, it is clear that not only economic goals 
and perspectives can count. Widening the analysis (towards LEGA) involves two steps: 
(One) Behavioral legal research will be accompanied and supplemented by other strands of 
empirical research which concentrate more or exclusively on social, political, cultural, or 
other institutional contexts. (Two) Empirical psychological studies of human behavior, in 
particular of decision making, can and should (where this seems possible) themselves 
integrate such contexts by taking into account additional variables that influence people’s 
behavior and psychological processes (apart from legal rules, personal and situational 
characteristics) like social norms, cultural patterns, political affiliations, education and 
family background etc. 
 
II. Does behavioral legal research merely employ empirical descriptive methods or 
does it contain specific normative theories? 
Behavioral legal research can, in theory, assume a value-neutral descriptive standpoint if it 
sticks to its empirical observations and separates them completely from normative assum-
ptions and concepts used by its interpreters. In reality, authors most often place their 
behavioral legal studies in a normative and political context.21 The political agenda pursued 
is in some cases neo-liberal: According to those liberal authors, new freedom preserving 
“softer” instruments of state regulation and self-regulation (private ordering) shall be 
preferred over traditional hard paternalist intervention.22 According to other authors, the 
newly discovered structural behavioral weaknesses of market actors (as well as of law 
makers and judges) can be viewed as an additional justification of existing mandatory state 
                                                
20 Sabine Frerichs, 34 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER POLICY 289 (2011). 
21 For the difficulty of separating descriptive and normative elements in behavioral research see: Brigitta Lurger, 
Gerechtigkeitskonzepte für ein europäisches Vertragsrecht und Instrumente zu ihrer Umsetzung, in STEFAN ARNOLD (ed.), 
GRUNDLAGEN EINES EUROPÄISCHEN VERTRAGSRECHTS, 101, 121 et seq. (2014); Brigitta Lurger, Selbstverantwortung versus 
Solidarität im Vertragsrecht, in STUDIENGESELLSCHAFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFT UND RECHT (ed.), SELBSTVERANTWORTUNG VERSUS 
SOLIDARITÄT IM WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 159, 166 et seq. (2014). 
22 OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT 32 (2012); Cass R. Sunstein, Nudges vs. Shoves, 127 HARVARD LAW REVIEW FORUM 
210, 211 et seq. (2014) argues that even though mandatory rules may be preferable in some cases, freedom 
preserving soft regulation (as for instance nudging) in most cases shows more benefits and is less costly than 
alternative approaches. For convincing evidence that really effective information can be more costly and almost 
equally intrusive as alternative approaches see NATALI HELBERGER, FORM MATTERS: INFORMING CONSUMERS EFFECTIVELY, STUDY 
COMMISSIONED BY BEUC 5 (September 2013).  
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regulation or as a justification of additional or stricter state regulation.23 This latter view 
coincides with the political orientation of some other schools of legal realism, for instance 
with “vulnerability analysis”. The recommendations of neo-liberal behavioral scholars partly 
coincide with the recommendations made by neo-classical economic analysis of law:24 
Autonomy preserving modes of governance (like self-regulation, information policy, and 
default rules) are to be preferred over direct government intervention by mandatory legal 
rules. In other cases, the political background of a behavioral study is not directly 
addressed and left for the detective’s nose of the critical reader to be revealed.  
Two questions arise: Which of the two legal-political directions is to be preferred? Is there 
any compelling argument derived from behavioral empirical research or the famous 
“behavioral insights”25 that points in the one rather than in the other direction? I will 
introduce the answer to these questions by a short analysis of a widely supported school of 
behavioral law and economics: the so-called “libertarian paternalism”, and by pointing to 
the concept of “emergent analytics” according to which the initial study of reality may 
influence the ensuing adoption of a normative theory. 
“Governance” (like the EU Governance in the Commission’s White Paper)26 and behavioral 
research in law and economics, like Thaler and Sunstein’s “libertarian paternalism”,27 are 
often associated with the promotion of “soft” forms of governance, “soft” forms of 
influencing and steering people’s behavior, which are considered preferable to traditional 
compulsory “hard” regulation for various reasons. Replacing “hard” by “soft” instruments of 
governance is often supposed to increase not only the effectiveness (with respect to the 
relevant regulatory goal pursued: as for instance consumer protection), but also the 
freedom of choice of the citizens concerned (autonomy preserving) and to lower the overall 
costs for the economy.28 Words often used in that context are for instance: private 
governance, private ordering, voluntary standards of performance, nudges, defaults, or 
“behaviorally informed” instruments and rules.  
                                                
23 Ryan Bubb and Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and Why, 127 Harvard Law Review 1593 
(2014); Brigitta Lurger, in STEFAN ARNOLD (ed.), GRUNDLAGEN EINES EUROPÄISCHEN VERTRAGSRECHTS 101, 122 (2014); SARAH 
CONLY, AGAINST AUTONOMY (2012); Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 647 (2011); Brigitta Lurger, in STUDIENGESELLSCHAFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFT UND RECHT (ed.), 
SELBSTVERANTWORTUNG VERSUS SOLIDARITÄT IM WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 159, 176 (2014). 
24 Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, and Richard H. Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, in CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN (ed.), BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 13, 30, 51 (2000) point out that the behavioral law and economics 
approach is not as radical as the neo-classical law and economics approach in rejecting every type of mandatory 
paternalistic intervention, which they call “reflexive antipaternalism”. 
25 See FN 16. 
26 COMMISSION, EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE – A WHITE PAPER, OJ 12 October 2001, C 287/1. 
27 Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, 93 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 175 (2003); Cass R. 
Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism is not an Oxymoron, 70 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW 1159 
(2003); Richard H. THALER AND CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE (2008); Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Preferences, 
Paternalism, and Liberty, 59 PHILOSOPHY SUPPLEMENT 233 (2009); Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW 1349 (2011); Cass R. Sunstein, The Storrs Lectures: Behavioral Economics and 
Paternalism, 122 YALE LAW JOURNAL 1826 (2013). 
28 See the discussion in FN 22. 
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“Libertarian paternalism” is considered by its creators a “Third Way” which reconciles neo-
liberal (liberty) and more interventionist (paternalism) approaches to law:29 “Choice 
architects can preserve freedom of choice while also nudging people in directions that will 
improve their lives”. But is “behaviorally informed” soft or libertarian paternalism really the 
solution to all the problems mentioned? Does it dissolve the tension between freedom and 
protection and settle the conflict between economic efficiency and other societal goals of 
regulation?  
Libertarian paternalists assume that there is a gap between the decisions actually made by 
individuals being subject to cognitive biases and other decisional inadequacies and the 
choices they would have made as rational unbiased decision makers. Their cognitive 
defects are considered to be a particular type of market failure, the “behavioral market 
failure”,30 which has to be corrected by government intervention. These cognitive mistakes 
are, according to Sunstein,31 “firmly rooted” in “system one” of the human brain, whereas 
the – presumptive or real – “rational self” of individuals is situated in “system two”.32 
Libertarian paternalists use behavioral research establishing the existence of human biases 
and other cognitive mistakes not only as a justification for state intervention, but also as a 
basis for designing new instruments which steer people’s behavior more effectively in the 
desired direction: by taking advantage of these weaknesses or by correcting them 
otherwise.  
“Libertarian paternalism”33 has been criticized by authors in various respects. The most 
important points of critique are, in my view, the following:  
1. Libertarian paternalists do not present a clear concept of the role of autonomy in their 
normative theory: The notion of “nudges” comprises a large range of instruments (inclu-
ding for instance default rules, disclosure, warnings, anchoring, framing).34 Some of them 
are more, others are less transparent. Nudges are only effective in influencing people’s 
behavior if people follow them consciously or unconsciously. Nudges are only freedom 
preserving if it is a realistic scenario for people to opt out (thus not following the nudge). In 
addition, opting out is only possible where nudges are transparent. Thus, government 
                                                
29 RICHARD H. THALER AND CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 252 (2008). 
30 Cass R. Sunstein, 122 YALE LAW JOURNAL 1826, 1842 et seq. (2013): The “behavioral market failures” discussed by 
Sunstein are the following: present bias and time inconsistency, ignoring shrouded (but important) attributes 
(importance of salience), unrealistic optimism, and problems with probability.  
31 Cass R. Sunstein, 122 YALE LAW JOURNAL 1826, 1842 et seq. (2013). 
32 For the (debated) distinction between two processes of thinking which have neuropsychological correlates in 
different brain areas see for instance DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW  19 et seq. (2011); Matthew D. 
Lieberman, Social Cognitive Neuroscience: A Review of Core Processes, 58 ANNUAL REVIEW OF PSYCHOLOGY 259 (2007); 
Jonathan St. B. T. Evans, Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning and Judgment, and Social Cognition, 59 ANNUAL REVIEW OF 
PSYCHOLOGY 255 (2008): system one is fast, automatic, frugal and unconscious, system two is slow, deliberate, 
controlled, conscious and needs a lot of capacity. 
33 See also ROBERT NEUMANN, LIBERTÄRER PATERNALISMUS (2013). 
34 See the list of „nudges“ (called „freedom-preserving tools) in the Appendix of Cass R. Sunstein, The Council of 
Psychological Advisers (2014) http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2496438.  
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intervention by nudging cannot be both effective and freedom preserving. It is freedom 
preserving if people are free not to follow the nudge. Where they do not follow the nudge, 
nudging is not effective. Effective nudging depends on a majority of people not making use 
of their choice to resist the nudge.35 Libertarian paternalists who insist on effective nudges 
risk being criticized for their restriction of party autonomy by neo-liberals. Libertarian 
paternalists who insist on the freedom to opt out risk being criticized for the 
ineffectiveness of their recommended regulation.  
2. Libertarian paternalists do not present a clear concept of the yardstick for their 
interventions and of the preferences of people: Nudged people do not follow their initial 
preferences, but the preferences recommended by the government, which are said to be 
the preferences of their (fictitious) “rational selves”. Who determines what the “rational 
self” really wants? Who tells us what people, if they were rational, would think is good for 
them? 36 Can system one driven decisions never be the rights ones? Are they only right 
where people succeed in resisting a nudge (by opting out and refusing to be nudged) or are 
they still wrong in this case?37 When is it legitimate to restrict private autonomy of decision 
making and when not?38 
3. Where businesses try to manipulate people’s subconscious, it is the government’s task to 
forbid or define the limits of such strategies. But what if governments themselves engage 
in nudging people without them even noticing it? The result of such government inter-
vention is the same as the result of “hard” regulation, which forbids certain behavior and 
allows other. Both regulatory techniques, therefore, share the dependency on the quality 
and legitimacy of the normative choice by the government (to restrict certain behavior and 
to support other). Only the way to the shared result differs: Outright prohibitions are 
transparent for everyone and may be debated or criticized in public, and later on, as a 
consequence, be changed by the legislator. Invisible nudges leave the nudged without 
awareness of the intervention, in the first place. This may inhibit public discussion and 
legislative change. Thus, a hidden (“behavioral”) intervention may be considered even more 
disruptive of individual autonomy than traditional outright prohibitions.39 
4. By concentrating on nudges (which leave an – though sometimes unrealistic – element of 
choice for the citizen) libertarian paternalists narrow their analysis and do not deal with 
cases where mandatory rules and prohibitions may be preferable to any other type of 
regulation and to non-regulation for certain reasons. They do no signalize readiness to link 
their agenda to a broader analytical concept as, for instance, the one described supra 
                                                
35 Riccardo Rebonato, A Critical Assessment of Libertarian Paternalism, 37 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER POLICY 357, 370 (2014); 
Ryan Bubb and Richard H. Pildes, 127 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 1593, 1616 (2014). 
36 Wolfgang Kerber, Soft Paternalismus und Verbraucherpolitik 11 et seq. (2014) http://papers.ssrn.com/-
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2497426.  
37 Ryan Bubb and Richard H. Pildes, 127 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 1593, 1625 (2014). 
38 Riccardo Rebonato, 37 JOURNAL CONSUMER POLICY 357, 374, 378, 388 (2014). 
39 Riccardo Rebonato, 37 JOURNAL CONSUMER POLICY 357, 360, 392 (2014). 
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(LEGA).40 They are, however, closely linked to one discipline – economics: Libertarian 
paternalists endorse and need the neo-classical concept of rationality.41  
5. This, of course, invites another critique: Legal analysis should not be made (exclusively) 
dependent on normative economic theories and economic models. The model of economic 
man, having been abandoned by many behavioral economists, should not be revived by 
the hybrid construct of “rational self” in law. The use of system one of the brain does not 
always produce a mistake that has to be corrected, but may – depending on the situation – 
lead to “good”, i.e. “ecologically rational”, decisions.42 If the use of system one in decision 
making is both omnipresent and not always detrimental, how can it be considered a 
“market failure” (again an economic concept!) which means an exception to the ordinary 
situation of a well-functioning unregulated market? Perhaps we should rather abandon the 
traditional neo-classical economic models and develop a new theory which is better able to 
integrate the normal every day cases of biased and heuristic decision making and is better 
able to address all the needs, tasks and particularities of problem solving by law (without 
being restricted to the economic efficiency perspective).43   
My conclusions with respect to libertarian paternalism are: Libertarian paternalists have a 
strong normative agenda and make no attempt to separate descriptive and normative 
parts of their research. They can be seen as an example for the observation that, in the 
work of many authors, behavioral research and normative theories are closely intertwined.  
Their claim that behavioral research will lead to a reconciliation of old normative conflicts 
like the one between autonomy and (paternalistic) state intervention is not entirely 
convincing. They do not show that empirical behavioral research holds any compelling 
arguments for either more freedom preserving or more intrusive regulatory instruments, 
but borrow their respective arguments from normative economic analysis of law. The 
impression sometimes created that “nudges” are always less costly and economically more 
efficient than other types of regulation is not correct. It is the great merit of libertarian 
paternalists to have brought legal instruments closer to the reality of people’s lives and 
behavior, thus, providing a basis for the development of improved legal instruments in 
some areas of regulation like health, consumer, and environmental protection. And they 
have stirred a renewed and most welcome discussion on paternalism in legal regulation 
which brings together economists and legal scholars. 
                                                
40 Kerber, therefore, suggests integrating the idea of preferring soft instruments over hard regulation into a broader 
concept of governance: Wolfgang Kerber, Soft Paternalismus und Verbraucherpolitik 19 (2014) http://papers.ssrn.com/-
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2497426. 
41 Riccardo Rebonato, 37 JOURNAL CONSUMER POLICY 357, 362 (2014). 
42 Peter M. Todd and Gerd Gigerenzer, Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart, 23 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES 727 
(2000) 727; Peter M. Todd, How Much Information Do We Need? 177 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH 1317 
(2007); GERD GIGERENZER, GUT FEELINGS: THE INTELLIGENCE OF THE UNCONSCIOUS (2007); Gerd Gigerenzer, Why Heuristics Work, 
3 PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 20 (2008); Gerd Gigerenzer and Henry Brighton, Homo Heuristicus: Why Biased 
Minds Make Better Inferences, 1 TOPICS IN COGNITIVE SCIENCES 107 (2009). 
43 Brigitta Lurger, in STUDIENGESELLSCHAFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFT UND RECHT (ed.), SELBSTVERANTWORTUNG VERSUS SOLIDARITÄT IM 
WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 159, 164 et seq. (2014). 
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The idea that descriptive behavioral findings may change only the means employed in legal 
regulation whereas existing goals may remain intact intends to preserve the behavioral 
legal research’s relative normative neutrality.44 But in reality, goals and means are often 
influencing each other.45 Legal rules (“means”) are more complex creatures than mere 
instruments to reach a single regulatory goal. Nourse and Shaffer describe the method of 
“emergent analytics” by which empirical research is used as a process of “discovery” for a 
theory or a normative agenda.46 In this conception the empirical research directly 
influences the prescriptive or normative theory adopted by the researchers at a later stage 
of their work. Purnhagen uses a similar method in his behavioral analysis of EU Internal 
Market Law.47 Thus, emergent analytics is a different type of example for a close link 
between descriptive empirical methods and the normative theories employed by scholars 
engaged in legal-empirical research. 
The relation between empirical findings about people’s behavior and normative concepts 
(like for instance the model of the average consumer or the average business woman), 
which refer to expected behavior of people, can be examined from still another 
perspective: Normative models of persons are abstract and generalizing concepts. They do 
not simply reflect the characteristics of concrete people involved in a legal transaction. 
They are primarily expressions of the regulatory approach endorsed by the legislator and 
the courts. “Rational egotists” as guiding normative model will necessitate different rules 
and regulation for their market behavior than “biased and confused” market participants 
who also care for the interests of others. But, in a second step, on the control level of the 
constitution and of human rights, lawyers have to ensure that their normative models stay 
in reasonable proximity to reality: The legislator assuming exaggerated vulnerability of 
average weaker parties (like employees, consumers, and tenants) risks violating the 
freedom rights of stronger contract parties (employers, businesses, landladies). The 
legislator assuming exaggerated rationality and wisdom of average market actors risks 
violating its constitutional duties of protecting weaker contract parties.  
As a consequence, the psychological empirical findings reflecting the characteristics of 
people’s behavior may influence normative models on two levels: on the constitutional 
control level, where the link to reality is decisive, and on the level of the regulatory 
approach of ordinary law which depends on the person model adopted. In my view, the 
discovery of people’s biases, bounded rationality and social motivation, as opposed to their 
previously presumed unbounded rationality and selfishness can lead to only one 
                                                
44 Florian Möslein, Privatrechtliche Regelsetzung, Governance und Verhaltensökonomik, 1 AUSTRIAN LAW JOURNAL 140 (2014).  
45 “Only when we recognize that certain means are available to us do we discover goals which had not occurred to us 
before”: Joas describing the work of Dewey [Victoria Nourse and Gregory Shaffer, 95 CORNELL LAW REVIEW 61, 84 FN 85 
(2009)]. 
46 Victoria Nourse and Gregory Shaffer, 95 CORNELL LAW REVIEW 61, 84 et seq. (2009). 
47 KAI PURNHAGEN, WHY DO WE NEED RESPONSIVE REGULATION AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH IN EU INTERNAL MARKET LAW? 
Wageningen Working Papers in Law and Governance, Law and Governance Group 2014/05. 
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conclusion on the level of normativity: Weaker contract parties, but also enterprises and 
citizens in general, need more support and protection by the government, by soft or hard 
regulation, but not less – as compared to the unrealistic model of the rational homo 
economicus.48 
My answers to the initial questions posed in this chapter are the following: The basis of 
behavioral legal research is descriptive empirical studies. Every attempt to make these 
studies useful or applicable in a legal governance context (including their initial conception) 
links the empirical methods to normative preconceptions, theories and agendas. It is 
possible and recommendable to make both elements of the research – the empirical and 
the normative – transparent and discuss them separately. Some approaches of behavioral 
legal studies focus on the improvement of legal rules (means) while trying to keep the 
regulatory goals untouched, other approaches openly pursue a normative agenda or look 
for inspiration for normative theories in empirical findings. The normative theories 
endorsed and the values defended by behavioral scholars are not a direct consequence of 
their empirical findings. The political conflicts tackled by the legal system (autonomy versus 
intervention, freedom versus social protection and distributive justice) are the basis of 
these normative theories, these conflicts remain the same.  
The contributions of behavioral empirical research to normative theories can be seen as 
rather indirect and comparatively small. The discovery of particular weaknesses of 
individuals which influence their decision making processes in a negative way seems to 
prove that people are more vulnerable than traditional law – sticking to its homo 
economicus model – assumed. This empirical finding delivers an additional argument in 
favor of theories that advocate strong state regulation of markets in order to prevent harm 
to these individuals or the economy. And behavioral empirical research has shed new light 
on questions crucial for normative theories, like: What is an “informed decision”? What is a 
“free decision”? It thus gives us the chance to re-open the normative debate on the right 
version of paternalism on an interdisciplinary level. A closely linked debate – also freshly 
inspired by recent behavioral research – is the debate about the role and the value of 
economic models and of which economic models for the law. In both debates empirical 





                                                
48 Ryan Bubb and Richard H. Pildes, 127 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 1593, 1598 (2014): They argue that the detection of 
human deficiencies in decision making (by psychological research) cannot lead to the conclusion (drawn by 
libertarian paternalists) that freedom of choice must be preserved (by soft regulatory techniques like nudging), but 
rather to the contrary.  
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III. Which are the risks of empirical legal and behavioral research? 
The enthusiasm that interdisciplinary perspectives revealing interesting new research 
questions might cause in legal scholars might blind us for the limitation and risks of legal-
empirical research, which will, therefore, be briefly mentioned in this chapter. 
1. A lot of behavioral empirical research with respect to human decision making was either 
conducted from a psychological or an economic perspective and did not involve legal rules 
as a factor of the analysis. Reference to such empirical research is fraught with a lot of 
dangers for legal scholars. It must first be established if and why such studies might allow 
conclusions for the law, at all. 
2. The limits of possible conclusions to be drawn from psychological studies and 
experiments for the “law in action” are still critical in cases of empirical studies which focus 
on the role of legal rules in the decision making process. Apart from perhaps field studies, 
empirical studies most often create highly artificial settings for the individuals under 
examination. It is, therefore, difficult or impossible to argue that the results of these 
studies would be the same in real life confrontation of individuals with the relevant 
decisional problem or the relevant legal rule(s).    
3. Another risk of empirical-legal research is called “scientism”:49 The importance and 
difficulty of a clear distinction of the descriptive and the prescriptive part of behavioral 
legal research was already discussed in the previous chapter. The risk of scientism is 
greater for those forms of legal-empirical research which start with a strong normative 
theory. The value of the empirical methods, especially quantitative methods, might be 
overestimated. Empirical results might be misinterpreted as scientific value-neutral proof 
of the initial normative assumptions. The self-referentiality of the conception of the 
empirical study might have been overlooked: The study was designed already under 
influence of the normative theory. Emergent analytics and under-theorized forms of 
empirical research evade this risk.50 
4. Another risk of the so-called “law and …” research is “reductionism”:51 Law might be 
reduced to only one dimension, the one represented in the “and”-discipline, for instance to 
its psychological or to its economic dimension. Behavioral law and economics was 
particularly criticized for focusing only on individual psychological processes and the law’s 
influence on individual choice while excluding the institutional, social and cultural 
dimensions of governance problems. Thus, for instance culturally shaped preconceptions 
(e.g. from the US) might distort the results of behavioral studies completely unnoticed by 
the researchers themselves.52 This reductionism can be avoided by integrating behavioral 
                                                
49 Victoria Nourse and Gregory Shaffer, 95 CORNELL LAW REVIEW 61, 117 (2009). 
50 Victoria Nourse and Gregory Shaffer, 95 CORNELL LAW REVIEW 61, 119 et seq. (2009). 
51 Victoria Nourse and Gregory Shaffer, 95 CORNELL LAW REVIEW 61, 116 (2009). 
52 Sabine Frerichs, 34 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER POLICY 289 (2011). 
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legal research in a broader legal-empirical governance analysis (LEGA) as the one described 
in the first chapter of this article. In addition, psychological studies conducted by behavioral 
legal researchers can attempt to include institutional, social, cultural and other factors as 
variables in their examination of human decision making. 
5. As a last problematic point the considerable costs and burdens of empirical research 
must be mentioned. Bearing in mind that behavioral research can only make limited 
contributions to governance problems and is not an over-all miracle cure for all legal 
problems, a thorough cost-benefit analysis, which works with realistic predictions of the 
possible scientific or knowledge gains, must be conducted before engaging into time and 
money consuming empirical studies. Lawyers in practice as well as legal academics 
routinely work with their every-day experience of human behavior as one of their most 
important tools. Costly empirical studies should, if possible, avoid replicating in their 
results what is already a well-established part of such every-day knowledge and 
experience. 
 
IV. Which are the relevant research questions in the area of private law as opposed 
to public law? 
Behavioral research, in private as well as in public law, may follow two different paths: It 
can focus on the decision making of judges, administrative officers, and the members of 
legislative bodies or it can focus on the decision making of citizens. I will deal only with the 
last possibility here, the decisions of citizens, and ask how legislation and court decisions 
can best accommodate the empirical findings of psychology about the characteristics of 
human decision making in private law. 
The classical decisions of citizens analyzed by behavioral law and economics authors are 
decisions concerning the citizens’ health, their financial situation and sustainable 
consumption (for instance energy economy). The relationship under examination is the 
one between the state and the citizen: Citizens are about to make “wrong” decisions: i.e. 
decisions which they will regret later on and/or which do not reflect what they want and/or 
which cause personal or financial harm to them. How can governmental action prevent 
citizens from acting against their own interests? This is a classical situation of paternalism. 
The spectrum of possible state action under examination ranges from information policy 
and various (other) “nudges” to outright prohibitions and should also take into account the 
institutional and contextual perspective of other organizations, people, or social norms 
potentially influencing citizens’ decisions.  
It is important to note at this point that “wrong” decisions in that sense are not only caused 
by biases and other decisional inadequacies – rooted in the citizens´ brains – but also by 
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the market situation (e.g. asymmetric lack of information) or by the other party of a contract 
who abuses its dominant position to the detriment of the weaker party.53 These aspects of 
information and power asymmetry with respect to another (stronger) contract party, which 
constitute an external threat to the quality of decision making of a citizen, are often 
neglected in behavioral law and economics analysis. The reduction of the analysis to the 
two pole relationship between the regulating state and the citizen is certainly justified 
when dealing with problems of public law. But it is distorting for the analysis of private law 
relationships in which at least three agents are relevant: the regulating state and the two 
citizens. 
In addition, as mentioned in chapter III supra, the behavioral analysis of private law 
relationships should not be limited to “nudges” as instruments of regulation,54 nor to legal 
rules aiming at influencing the decision making of individual parties while exercising their 
private autonomy. Where information policies and information duties as well as various 
(other) nudges do not work, mandatory rules and prohibitions must be considered. Where 
influencing individual behavior and private enforcement of individual rights do not work, 
other institutional solutions must be taken into account, like collective enforcement by 
interest (stakeholder) organizations or public enforcement. These collective and public 
activities might in their turn influence individual decisions to enter into a contractual 
relationship or to engage in some other commercial activity. 
1. One group of research questions deals with the normative models of citizens widely used 
in private law: like the model of the informed average consumer or of the ordinary 
merchant. These models are, for example, employed to determine the objective meaning 
of (legally relevant) declarations (like for instance a contract offer), to determine the 
standard of care required by law, to determine when a commercial practice is deceptive, or 
to determine which kind of information has to be provided in which form to weaker 
parties. Where empirical behavioral research seems to provide evidence that people 
(consumers as well as businesses, though probably to a different degree) are easier 
mistaken, or are acting in a less controlled and less rational manner in certain situations 
than assumed before, a corresponding correction of the normative model could be 
considered desirable, if there are no other reasons speaking against such a change. The 
areas of unfair commercial practices regulation and competition (anti-trust) law are in their 
normative approaches largely depending on such normative models of market actors and, 
therefore, offer ample space for behavioral legal research. The same applies to consumer 
law. 
                                                
53 Wolfgang Kerber, Soft Paternalismus und Verbraucherpolitik 14 (2014) http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?-
abstract_id=2497426. 
54 Ryan Bubb and Richard H. Pildes, 127 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 1593, 1632, 1658, 1673 (2014): for the particular cases of 
retirement savings, consumer credit and fuel economy regulation. 
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2. The currently most examined and most popular research question in private law is: How 
can state regulation help citizens or weaker parties to exercise their private autonomy 
more in their own interest, thus overcoming dangers that are created by themselves (brain 
functioning), by the market situation  (lack of information) or by the other market actors 
(businesses). The potential of reducing, framing, anchoring, standardizing information and 
warnings, of using new interactive electronic information schemes including short videos, 
of creating safe standardized default contracts (and the like) is doubtlessly great. Research 
in this area should also include the questions of how the notions of “freedom of decision” 
and “knowledge” are constructed by the law and whether these legal constructs are in 
reasonable proximity of the decisional reality of people. Is the role of knowledge and 
information overestimated by the law? In situations of time-constraint, accepting the 
ignorance and not taking the time to gather information may be the only way to a “good” 
(“environmentally rational”) decision. In these situations, but presumptively also in many 
others, the factors decisive for our “free” decisions to enter into a contract or not are 
shaped not so much by rationality and knowledge, but rather by heuristics, trust, habit, 
overall impressions, culture etc. Ben-Shahar and Schneider argue in their article on the 
failure of mandated disclosure that information duties in favor of consumers are 
completely overestimated and do not help or protect them at all.55 How can legal 
regulation aiming at improving “free” decision making adapt to this type of empirical 
findings? 
3. In contract law, informing and nudging a weaker party that the regulator wants to 
protect from making “wrong” decisions (see supra) in the frame of exercise of private 
autonomy is only one aspect of the situation. Firstly, there are two human actors to be 
influenced – or “nudged” – in their behavior: But yet nobody seems to analyze the question 
of how to nudge enterprises into behaving more fairly and regarding with respect to the 
weaker party. Secondly, one danger for weaker contract parties is not their behavioral 
weakness but stronger parties who try to abuse their superior knowledge and power. The 
ability of autonomy based soft instruments (information, nudges) to avert (stronger party) 
risks of that kind from weaker parties easily reaches its limits. What if neither sophisticated 
warnings nor defaults (probably aiming at influencing the behavior on both sides) are able 
to prevent a “bad” (grossly imbalanced or unfair) contract? The classical (potential) 
examples of such situations are: unfair clauses in standard contract terms (“boilerplate”),56 
irresponsible lending, usury loans, violations of the principle of good faith and fair dealing, 
and unconscionability. 
The answer is simple and already well known to European legislators (not entirely also to 
the US legislators): Here we need mandatory legislation which prohibits and eliminates 
                                                
55 Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider, 159 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 647 (2011). 
56 See Eva M. Tscherner, Can behavioral research advance mandatory law, information duties, standard terms and 
withdrawal rights? 1 AUSTRIAN LAW JOURNAL 150 et seq. (2014) with further references.   
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grossly unfair contractual relations and which is enforced by interest organizations or state 
authorities, not only the individual weaker party herself. The research question for 
behavioral legal analysis in that respect is: Where are the behavioral limits of autonomy 
preserving soft instruments of regulation which are as cleverly designed as possible (by 
framing, salience etc) in accordance with the latest “behavioral insights”? Considering the 
empirical results about their in/effectiveness, the normative question of when to resort to 
more intrusive forms of regulation has to be posed. This goes to the middle of the 
paternalism debate, which will not be settled by some kind of empirical evidence or the 
other, as I already argued in chapter II supra. But empirical behavioral research can provide 
us with some additional more precise and informed arguments in the debate. 
 
V. Conclusion 
A number of pitfalls and shortcomings of “behavioral legal research” can be avoided by 
placing it into the broader concept of “legal-empirical governance analysis” (LEGA) and by 
distinguishing it from a merely behavioral economic analysis of law. Behavioral legal 
research necessarily contains descriptive and normative elements which should be kept as 
transparent and as much apart as possible. Current behavioral empirical findings do not 
necessitate a particular normative theory, though they seem to support a stronger 
regulatory approach more than neo-liberal concepts. My deliberations lead me to an 
overall positive evaluation of the chances and expected gains of this type of research. If 
placed in the broader concept of LEGA and combined with a realistic awareness of all its 
risks and limitations, it is likely to provide new and helpful insights for scholars, judges and 
legislators in the field of private law. 
 
